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security in large population centers and near potential highvalue terrorist targets. Included
in these efforts was the development of a more robust border security program, with an
emphasis on reducing the threat of terrorist infiltration at America's borders. However,
nearly a decade after 9/11, terrorism and organized crime continue to pose significant
threats to the United States. As many of these threats emanate from other nations,
improved border security helps mitigate these threats. This article summarizes known
terrorist activity along the U.S. northern and southern borders, and highlights the threat of
organized crime in the southwest border region. Furthermore, it analyzes current border
security efforts and identifies key deficiencies in the system. Finally, it provides a tool kit
for future border security endeavors that center on developing a larger but more
coordinated and nimble border security force, driven by intelligence, and supported by
proven technologies and tactical infrastructure.
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Introduction
Few topics in American public discourse are as controversial as border
security and illegal immigration. Presently, notions of "traditional" illegal
immigration dominate the debate. News agencies and advocacy groups
focus primarily on the movement of workers from Mexico or Central/
South America into the United States. However, mixed within this element are sophisticated intercontinental criminal networks comprised of
drug cartels, human smugglers, and gangs that stretch from America's
southern border to Central and South America to Africa and Europe. Not
only are these networks responsible for the raging drug war in Mexico,
but they also pose a significant threat to U.S. citizens and law enforcement living and working along the border. Additionally, their connections
with U.S.-based criminal groups directly contribute to criminal activity in
America.1
Furthermore, there is growing concern over the expansion of Islamic
extremism in the Western world. Evidence suggests that there is a significant presence of anti-American Islamic groups operating in the Americas.2 Every year, federal, state, and local agencies catch thousands of
special interest aliens (SIA)—individuals who originate from special interest countries (SIC) identified by the U.S. Government to harbor and/or
otherwise support international terrorism—fueling concerns that extremists are increasingly utilizing existing illegal networks to move operatives
and materials into the United States.3 From the numerous SIA encounters and the seizures of jihadist materials along the southwest border, it
appears that SIA's travel from countries overseas to Central and South
America, and then attempt to infiltrate America's borders illegally. The
northern border is not immune to these infiltrations, either. Beyond the
threat emanating from the U.S./Mexico border, there are al-Qaida-linked
cells and grassroots extremist groups operating in Canada. Several previous terrorist plots involved jihadists illegally crossing the Canadian border either to plot attacks or to recruit and fundraise.4
The United States has made significant strides in improving border security following 9/11. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS), born
out of the aftermath of these events, has over the past nine years pursued
critical improvements in airport security and customs enforcement.
While some security enhancements have been made, notably at the Customs and Border Patrol (CBP), a component of DHS, security between
border checkpoints remains insufficient; and limited resources leave the
overwhelming majority of U.S. borders vulnerable.5 While it is impossible
to completely secure America's borders, officials should pursue several
key improvements. First, the homeland security workforce should be con30
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tinually developed into a highly skilled and nimble force. Second, the
workforce should be led by coordinated and actionable intelligence and
supported by advanced tools and technologies. Finally, intelligence must
be available to and leveraged by existing state and local law enforcement
agencies.

Understanding the Threat at America's Borders
Security controls and policies at America's borders enable the flow of millions of people and facilitate the transactions of billions of dollars of legal
commerce each year. However, intertwined with everyday legal activities
exists a complex tapestry of sophisticated illegal enterprises vying to
exploit America's porous borders. Along the U.S./Mexico border, drug
cartels, human smugglers, kidnapping rings, thieves, and gangs contribute to an increasingly dangerous environment for citizens and law
enforcement of both countries. Deteriorating border security environments, created in part by the brutal drug war raging in Mexico to the
south and the lax security posture along the U.S./Canadian border to the
north, provide openings for international terrorist groups and criminal
enterprises to fundraise, recruit, and plan attacks.6 As a result, terrorists
who have operated in Canada, such as Ghazi Ibrahim, Abu Mezer, Lafi
Khalil, Ahmed Ressam, and the "Toronto 18" exemplify the shared security risk for both Canada and the United States.

The Growing Threat of Organized Crime along the
Southwest Border
The single greatest driving force affecting the security environment along
the U.S./Mexico border is organized crime, and, more specifically, Mexico's violent drug war. Operating throughout the U.S./Mexico border
region is a web of sophisticated illegal organizations that leverage wellestablished networks to move goods and people across America's borders.
These groups include drug cartels, human smugglers, gun smugglers, kidnappers, gangs, and thieves.
The drug cartels are by far the most sophisticated, utilizing advanced military weaponry, state of the art technology, and paramilitary tactics.7
These cartels and their enforcers wield substantial power and control key
routes into the United States, as well as vast territories in Mexico. For
years the cartels have used bribes and intimidation to corrupt thousands
of government officials and exert authority. According to Mexico's Public
Safety Secretary, Genaro Garcia Luna, in 2010 drug cartels paid around
$100 million dollars a month in bribes to municipal police officers across
31
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Mexico to ensure that their activities went undisturbed.8 The corruption
reached epidemic levels. While the government maintained control over
much of Mexico City, eventually the outlying regions in Mexico effectively
fell under the control of the cartels.
The drug war problem started in 2006 when more than 2,000 people died
in Mexico at the hands of the drug cartels.9 In response, the Mexican military and federal police launched an offensive to weaken their organizations, bring drug-related violence down, and root out government
corruption. However, the drug war progressed and the death toll escalated as the cartels turned to more extreme measures to protect their turf
and their shipments. As Mexican authorities weakened one organization,
others rushed in to fill the vacuum. Soon two wars were being fought: one
between rival cartels over highly lucrative drug turf and another between
the cartels and the government.10 By 2008, the number of homicides
more than doubled; and in 2010, Mexico experienced more than 11,000
drug-related homicides.11 In total, more than 28,000 crime-related
deaths have occurred in Mexico since the beginning of the drug war in
2006.12 Included among the dead are more than 915 municipal police
officers, 698 state police, and 463 federal agents.13
As the drug war continues, the cartels have increasingly turned to more
devastating weapons, such as high-powered assault rifles, fragmentation
grenades, incendiary grenades, Molotov cocktails, and improvised explosive devices in attacks on government officials. Once an isolated threat,
violence is now present in most regions of Mexico, with the vast majority
occurring in areas along the U.S./Mexico border in states like Baja, Chihuahua, Nuevo Leon, and Tamaulipas. For example, in Ciudad Juarez,
located just across the border from El Paso, Texas, more than 6,500 people have died since the beginning of 2008.14 At 191 homicides per
100,000, Ciudad Juarez ranks as the most violent place in the western
hemisphere.15
The violence is not restricted to Mexico. Murders and kidnappings on the
U.S. side of the border have increased significantly over the past few
years.16 Because of the increased pressure placed on the cartels by both
Mexican and U.S. security officials, the cartels have escalated their tactics,
and U.S. law enforcement increasingly experiences violent encounters
with cartel members. Today, smugglers do not hesitate to confront law
enforcement and often fire upon them with automatic weapons and
engage in high-speed pursuits.17 Between October 2009 and March 2010,
for example, 134 CBP agents were assaulted, a 45 percent increase over
the 93 assaults CBP reported during the same period the prior year.18
32
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The cartels are incredibly adept at moving their shipments of drugs, utilizing a number of methods to transport their cargo and evade detection.
The cartel's solutions range from basic to highly sophisticated. Tunnels
running from safe houses on both sides of the border are common.
Between 2006 and 2010, law enforcement personnel uncovered 75 different tunnels running underneath the U.S. border.19 In addition, drug
smugglers have used ultra-light aircraft to carry illegal narcotics into the
United States. Between September of 2009 and May of 2010, the CBP Air
and Marine Operation Command (AMOC) identified more than 135 suspected incursions using ultra-light aircraft.20 The cartels have also begun
to use highly sophisticated semi-submersible boats to move large quantities of drugs. Other less sophisticated methods include traversing the
desert on ATVs and motorcycles, cutting or destroying fences, floating
narcotics across rivers, concealing drugs in vehicles or inside people's
bodies, using dead drops in concealed areas, and bribing border officials
to get through checkpoints.21

Impact of Mexican Organized Crime inside the United States
According to many law enforcement officials, there is growing interconnectivity between Mexican drug cartels, human smuggling networks, and
American gangs.22 While Mexican drug cartels are responsible for smuggling illicit goods across the border, gangs and criminal organizations
often are distributors of the drugs throughout the United States.23 Large
international street gangs like Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) and the Mexican
Mafia maintain a presence on both sides of the border and engage in
smuggling as well as distribution.24 In fact, U.S. law enforcement in at
least 28 states has reported catching MS-13 members engaged in drug
distribution since record-keeping of such incidents began.25 In addition,
motorcycle gangs like the Bandidos and Mongols maintain chapters
throughout the southwestern U.S. and use allied groups to spread their
narcotics northward.26 Even prison gangs and hundreds of localized
street gangs distribute illicit goods in places throughout the country.
In 2005, the U.S. Department of Justice estimated that approximately
30,000 gangs operated in the United States.27 While many of these gangs
are not formally or directly linked to the drug cartels, their symbiotic
relationship with them provides greater resources and capabilities that
threaten law-abiding citizens and law enforcement officers. The gangs use
the revenue provided by the distribution of narcotics to buy weapons and
fund other criminal enterprises, such as kidnapping, racketeering, and
property crime.28 Furthermore, the illicit markets fuel turf wars between
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rival groups over lucrative drug territory. These battles often place the
lives of innocent bystanders and place law enforcement officers in
jeopardy.

The Growing Threat of Terrorism
In addition to the threat posed by organized crime along the southwest
border, the threat of terrorist infiltration remains a critical concern at
both the northern and southern borders. Each year, U.S. law enforcement
agencies catch thousands of SIAs from SICs with known ties to terrorism
attempting to cross the border.29 Many of these SIAs are smuggled into
Central and South America and then illegally brought across America's
southwest border. Meanwhile, the presence of Islamic extremists in Canada highlights the threat of terrorism along America's northern border as
well.30

Border Data to Track the Terrorist Threat
It is difficult to accurately quantify the true threat terrorists pose to American borders. Today, the primary statistic used by border security experts
to evaluate the threat posed by terrorism is the number of Other than
Mexicans (OTM) and SIAs encountered along the border. However, basing terrorist threat assessments on the number of OTMs and SIAs
detained along the border is misleading. Not all SIAs are terrorists, and
some individuals originating from non-special-interest countries could
also pose a threat. It is unclear how many illegal aliens avoid capture, and
therefore, just as difficult to define the number of SIAs entering the country each year.

Terrorism at the Southwest Border
History demonstrates that terrorists search for security gaps and invent
creative ways to exploit them. In fact, terrorists rely on security weaknesses to operate effectively. International terrorist groups know that
criminal organizations in Central and South America maintain wellestablished networks that enable them to smuggle large quantities of narcotics and people across America's southern border. Terrorists could use
these illicit criminal networks to smuggle weapons, chemicals, biological
contaminants, and/or explosives into the United States. As Zapata
County, Texas Sheriff Sigifredo Gonzalez observed:
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"If smugglers can bring in tons of marijuana and cocaine at one
time and can smuggle twenty–thirty persons at one time, one can
just imagine how easy it would be to bring in two to three terrorists or their weapons of mass destruction…chances of apprehension are very slim."31
Terrorists also know that large segments of both the northern and southern border remain relatively unsecured. It is a known fact that several
radical international Islamic groups maintain significant operations in
Central and South America and engage in money laundering, drug trafficking, arms dealing, and other legitimate and illegitimate means to funnel millions of dollars every year into the hands of transnational
terrorists.32

Border Security: Successes and Deficiencies
Current State of Border Security
Balancing the need for security along America's borders with the economic imperative of protecting the legitimate flow of trade and travel into
the U.S. is a daunting challenge. CBP, as well as other state and federal
agencies, has made significant strides over the past decade in improving
their capabilities and leveraging minimal resources to meet these difficult
challenges. Over the past four years, CBP nearly doubled the number of
agents at its disposal, growing its ranks from approximately 11,000 agents
in 2006 to more than 20,100 at the close of 2009.33 These figures effectively make CBP the largest uniformed federal law enforcement agency in
the country.34
In 2005, CBP adopted its current strategy, which places an emphasis on
interdicting terrorists. The key objectives of this strategy are to: establish
a probability of apprehending terrorists as they attempt to enter between
ports of entry; deter illegal entries through improved enforcement; detect,
apprehend, and deter smugglers; leverage smart border technology; and
reduce border crime.35 Along the northern border, where the primary
concerns are terrorist infiltration and smuggling, the CBP emphasizes the
use of intelligence, liaison, and technology to bolster minimal levels of
personnel. To maximize the northern border strategy, CBP reaches out to
Canadian immigration and security agencies to improve coordination and
enhance intelligence gathering through the use of various technologies,
like cameras and remote sensors. The Integrated Border Enforcement
Teams (IBET) focuses on sharing intelligence and coordinating opera-
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tions between American and Canadian forces. Along the Southern border,
where illegal immigration and organized crime remain the key focus, CBP
emphasizes personnel, equipment, and tactical infrastructure.
A critical component of CBP's border security effort is the Secure Border
Initiative (SBI). Devised in late 2005, SBI was intended to help front-line
assets secure America's land borders with Canada and Mexico by ensuring the deployment of an integrated system that includes both tactical
infrastructure and technology.36 However, DHS cancelled further investment in the costly "virtual fence" and has promised to roll out a more integrated approach in future iterations.37
In addition to DHS and CBP, a number of other federal agencies support
the border security mission. These agencies include ICE, the FBI, the
ATF, the DEA, and the Coast Guard, among others. To prevent terrorism
and battle criminal organizations, CBP joined with ICE's Anti-Smuggling
Units to focus its intelligence and surveillance on known smuggling operations that traffic aliens from special interest nations, and developed joint
operations to target high interest smuggling activities.38

Critical Deficiencies in the System
While CBP has made significant improvements to the nation's border
security program over the past decade, significant deficiencies still exist.
In fact, major swaths of America's northern and southern borders remain
unsecured. One measure DHS uses to track their progress is the number
of miles under "effective control." Effective control of an area occurs when
the CBP is expected to apprehend a detected illegal border crosser.39 CBP
is responsible for securing approximately 8,607 miles of U.S. northern
and southern borders, including coastal sectors. As of May of 2009, DHS
effectively controlled only 894 miles of border, comprised of 697 miles
along the southwest border, 32 along the northern border, and 165 in the
coastal regions.40 To adequately meet the primary goals outlined in its
strategy to achieve and maintain effective control of U.S. borders, CBP
must improve these numbers significantly.
One reason for the limited miles under effective control is the failure to
implement a unified technological solution. The most recent attempt,
SBInet, became the primary technological component of the SBI. Commonly referred to as "the virtual fence," SBInet is a series of networked
cameras, sensors, radar systems, and communications equipment meant
to detect intruders and facilitate rapid response.41 The program began in
2006, and DHS intended to incrementally adopt the concept to cover
approximately 6,000 miles of America's borders with Mexico and Can36
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ada.42 However, DHS stopped work on the program in March of 2010. It
was eventually cancelled in early 2011, due to alleged missed deadlines
and cost overruns resulting from technical problems and program delays,
leaving an already insufficient number of agents with considerably less
support than originally intended.

Recommendations
Expand the CBP Ranks
For the Border Patrol to pursue its mission adequately, the U.S. Government must provide additional funding to drastically improve the CBP's
ability to recruit and train new agents. While the Border Patrol added
more than 1,700 agents to its workforce in FY2009, more manpower is
needed to provide even minimal security. Simply put, despite its large size
relative to other U.S. law enforcement bodies, the CBP is understaffed for
its mission and is therefore unable to effectively patrol the border, leaving
sizable areas with little enforcement. While technology and physical barriers can enhance security, without agents to guard a fence or respond to
tripped sensors, these countermeasures amount to little more than a
minor inconvenience to highly motivated criminals and international terrorists. To meet its increasingly difficult demands, the CBP should set a
goal to double its workforce over the next five years.

Reduce Agent Attrition Rates
In addition to recruiting and training additional agents, CBP must
address its high rate of attrition. After dropping to just 4 percent in 2005,
the CBP attrition rate jumped to about 10 percent in 2007.43 While the
most recent data is unavailable, in 2009 the rate remained at 10.1 percent.44 In 2003, the last time the attrition rate reached beyond 10 percent,
the Director of CBP noted that agent attrition was "reaching crisis proportions."45 According to the Director, the high rates of attrition at the time
resulted from lack of job satisfaction, lack of upward mobility, poor working conditions, and low pay compared to other law enforcement with similar positions. With the attrition rate reaching a similar level today, it is
likely that many of these same factors persist.
Such high rates of attrition make it more difficult to expand the CBP and
contribute to an overall lack of experience within the force. Put in simple
terms, a 10 percent attrition rate means that CBP needs to recruit and
train more than 2,000 additional agents each year just to maintain its
current numbers. Furthermore, it takes time and advanced training to
37
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replace the loss of a seasoned agent with a new recruit. To remedy this situation, CBP must work to provide additional opportunities for advancement to retain career-minded individuals, provide improved working
conditions wherever possible, increase CBP pay scales to the levels of
other federal law enforcement agencies, and provide other incentives to
promote the hiring and retention of CBP agents.

Leverage State and Local Law Enforcement
To enhance the reach and effectiveness of federal agents, the CBP must
improve their coordination with local law enforcement and provide training and resources to state and local law enforcement agencies near the
border. After all, even with significant increases in the CBP ranks, it is
impractical for the federal government to effectively patrol thousands of
miles of border alone. Furthermore, state and local law enforcement possess a unique understanding of the local area that can benefit federal
operations.
Some argue that border security is solely a federal government responsibility. This view came to the forefront in July of 2010, when the U.S. Government sued the State of Arizona to block the implementation of a
controversial law (SB 1070) that required police officers to check the
immigration status of individuals they approached for law enforcement
purposes. In U.S. v. Arizona, the federal government argued that, under
the Constitution, immigration enforcement is solely a federal matter.46
However, state and local officials along the border have a vested interest
in border security because they are often the most affected by the issues
plaguing the borderlands. Like their federal counterparts, they are
responsible for the safety and security of their citizens. In many of the
more remote border areas, the lack of a federal presence compels state
and local law enforcement to manage most border-related criminal matters on their own.47 When illegal immigrants cause property damage or
steal vehicles to bring them across the border, or when drug cartel members assault or kill someone, citizens call the local police. Unfortunately,
many of these agencies lack the necessary resources to effectively patrol
the hundreds or thousands of square miles under their control; partnership with the federal government is a must.
Simply put, when the federal government is unable to properly protect the
residents of a state or city from crime associated with illegal immigration,
terrorism, and illegal border crossings, then that responsibility falls on
the shoulders of state and local officials. In many ways, the passage of the
immigration law in Arizona stemmed from a widespread perception that
the federal government was not adequately addressing the concerns of
38
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citizens living along the border. In July 2010, U.S. Representative (Arizona) Gabrielle Giffords echoed that sentiment when she said:
"I am disappointed in the federal lawsuit against SB 1070 for the
same reason I was disappointed when this bill became law…the
supreme irony of the lawsuit is its premise that SB 1070 intrudes
on the federal government's responsibility to enforce immigration laws. Had the federal government taken that responsibility
seriously in the past, neither today's lawsuit nor the state law that
prompted it would be necessary."48
Instead of creating an adversarial relationship with state and local governments, the federal government should develop a partnership with
these agencies built on mutual self-interest. After all, the local agencies
can provide the manpower and local knowledge that the federal government often lacks, while the federal government can provide the financial,
materiel, and training support required at the local level.

Expand Anti-Corruption Efforts
As the ranks of border security personnel grow, law enforcement agencies
must expand their anti-corruption efforts to keep pace. The overwhelming majority of CBP agents perform their duties with integrity and honor.
Criminal organizations, however, are actively engaged in recruiting law
enforcement to help avoid detection. As a result, isolated acts of corruption do occur. Between October 1, 2004 and March of 2010, 103 CBP
officers were indicted or arrested on charges ranging from money laundering and smuggling to conspiracy.49
Few things threaten security operations more than corruption. It tarnishes the image of law enforcement and severely impacts the effectiveness of security measures. To combat this threat, CBP already employs a
number of anti-corruption measures, such as background checks, polygraph examinations, behavioral and analytical research tools, agent training, and misconduct investigations.50 Despite these efforts, corruption
still exists. So, while thorough screening practices and polygraph examinations remain critical elements of any anti-corruption plan, CBP must
continue to enhance its ability to identify and investigate incidents of corruption. In particular, law enforcement agencies should place a greater
emphasis on expanding the scope and prevalence of joint anti-corruption
task forces to root out corrupt law enforcement officers.
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Emphasize Acquisition of Off-the-Shelf Technologies in the
Near Term
In addition to drastically increasing the number of personnel dedicated to
securing the border, the government must accelerate the deployment of
advanced technologies to act as a force multiplier. Presently, border security personnel employ a variety of technologies—ranging from simple,
man-portable equipment like radios and night vision goggles—to vehicles
and other high-tech solutions like sensors, helicopters, planes, unmanned
aerial vehicles (UAVs), non-invasive detection equipment, and video surveillance systems.
Recently, DHS began a new approach to procure proven off-the-shelf
technologies to fill the void left by the failure of the SBInet program. This
approach is necessary to reduce lead times for fielding new equipment
and avoid costly failures like SBInet because policymakers must move
swiftly to provide the resources that front-line assets desperately require.
In dire demand is advanced surveillance equipment that can provide critical intelligence information, identify potential threats, display information across a common operating picture, evaluate the size and scope of a
threat, and track various threats until agents can respond.
In January of 2011, DHS issued a request for information (RFI) regarding
currently existing surveillance systems capable of operating from fixed
towers located at elevated sites.51 While it is unclear whether such a system currently exists to meet DHS requirements, these proposed Integrated Fixed Towers (IFT) could provide surveillance capabilities that
span an area of about 25 miles deep by about 30 miles wide. Conceivably,
if DHS were to link the cameras with a video-over-IP solution to enable
real-time video, then command centers could orchestrate a response from
miles away. While these technical systems have the potential to improve
detection and ultimately apprehension, they are stationary, and therefore,
limited in their ability to track targets over long distances.
UAVs, on the other hand, are proven, more versatile than fixed surveillance, and have the added benefit of being currently available. Employed
by the military all over the world, the Predator-B offers operationally
proven capabilities for border security. Unlike smaller UAVs, the Predator-B can handle high winds and carry up to 850 pounds internally and
3,000 pounds of sensors and equipment externally.52 With a speed of up
to 240 knots and an ability to remain aloft for thirty-four hours, the Predator-B can fly long endurance surveillance missions and provide real-time
feeds that cut through dense fog, cloud cover, or foliage to a central control center.53 More importantly, unlike IFTs, the Predator-B is a highly
40
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mobile asset, useful for tracking threats over long distances and easily
redeployable to adapt to changing operational requirements. While there
are legal considerations involved with flying UAVs over American or Mexican/Canadian territory, the areas where the UAVs would provide the
most impact are remote, limiting privacy concerns.

Pursue Long-Term Development of New Technologies
While fielding existing and proven technologies is critical to providing
assets that border security personnel need immediately, CBP cannot
entirely abandon the development of new technologies. The failure of
SBInet, for example, should not deter the government from pursuing
newer technologies. Future initiatives should include forward deployable
man-portable UAVs, ground-based drones, biometric scanners, and other
sensors.
One technology nearing the testing phase is the "Mega Blimp" platform
concept, which is conceivably able to stay aloft for weeks and provide
unique surveillance and tracking capabilities. If fielded, these footballfield-sized Mega Blimps could offer considerable advantages over other
UAV platforms. U.S. Army officials calculated that one Mega Blimp, for
example, could provide the same functions as twelve advanced Reaper
UAV drones.54 Northrop Grumman's version of the Mega Blimp, the Long
Endurance Multi-Intelligence Vehicle, can carry up to 2,500 pounds of
data links, sensors, antennas, and signals intelligence (SIGINT) equipment. Meanwhile, Lockheed Martin's blimp, the Integrated Sensor IS
Structure, can track the movement of people up to 185 miles away.55

Continue Development of Tactical Infrastructure in
Targeted Areas
Tactical infrastructure consists of various types of security structures,
such as physical barriers.56 While tactical infrastructure cannot provide
effective control by itself, it does act as a deterrent and supports law
enforcement operations by slowing illegal border crossers' ability to move
or escape, thereby decreasing the time it takes for law enforcement to
respond.57 Therefore, it is vital that CBP continue to employ and improve
physical barriers to reroute traffic to provide longer time frames for interdiction, and continue to build roads and trails to enable quicker response.
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Improve Information Sharing among Federal, State, and
Local Law Enforcement
The federal government should provide funding and guidance to state and
local authorities for the development of intelligence capabilities and use
of intelligence fusion centers to improve dissemination at all levels of government. It is often said that the default setting of any organization is not
to share. Politics and interagency rivalry often further erode cooperation.
Developing a system of true collaboration requires hard work, dedication,
and trust; however, maintaining a focus on the shared mission at hand
can help overcome many of the traditional turf battle issues. Improving
this coordination not only provides federal authorities with additional
sources of information, but also allows for quick dissemination of federal
intelligence and greater opportunities for collaboration.
One concept developed to handle this process is the intelligence fusion
center. Today, approximately fifty-eight intelligence fusion centers exist
in the United States.58 Largely formed by state and local authorities in
response to the attacks on 9/11, fusion centers facilitate information sharing and operational planning by combining and exchanging data and
intelligence from multiple sources and "fusing" it into more comprehensive actionable intelligence.59 In theory, these fusion centers facilitate collaboration among disparate groups, provide a more comprehensive
operating picture, and streamline dissemination. Use of these facilities
varies, however, and many depend on state funding to operate. This leads
to concerns that state governments may eliminate their fusion centers
because of budget concerns under tough economic conditions.60
Although many fusion centers staff federal law enforcement agents, each
fusion center develops its own standards, employs its own equipment,
and sets its own priorities. This can create issues in coordinating between
disparate centers and can slow down or even eliminate collaboration.
Nevertheless, these fusion centers offer a unique opportunity for improving collaboration among federal, state, and local levels. Therefore, the federal government should provide additional funding to maintain these
centers and push for standardization to improve interoperability and
capability.

Develop Rapid Response Capabilities
Even with dramatic increases in personnel, it will remain impossible to
man every mile of America's borders. As CBP fields advanced technologies to help surveil the border and detect and track intruders, the ability
to respond quickly to threats is paramount. The federal government
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should train local teams to work in coordination with border patrol assets
to manage rapid response. Because of the different environments and terrain along America's borders, response times, equipment, and training
needed to accomplish these tasks will depend on the location. Different
teams will need access to a broad array of technology, including helicopters, speedboats, and ATVs to accomplish their mission.

Install Border Outposts in Remote High Threat Areas
Distance is a critical component of response time. In many areas, CBP
posts exist miles behind geographic borders. Therefore, to limit the distance response forces must cover, CBP should create border patrol outposts in remote areas, closer to the border, to provide staging zones for
operations and incident response. Manning these posts with a rotation of
skilled rapid response teams would enable a quicker response and provide
a primary layer of security. As law enforcement detects a threat, CBP
could deploy assets from these advanced bases in coordination with assets
located further behind the border. This type of security in depth limits the
opportunity for evasion and increases the likelihood of interdicting
threats.

Emphasize Intelligence Driven Surge Operations
The criminals and terrorists operating along the borders constantly evolve
their tactics to avoid interdiction. They study the movement of law
enforcement and work to find ways to exploit weaknesses in security
plans. Therefore, it is critical that law enforcement continually adapts its
tactics to stay ahead of the terrorists and criminals. Much like random
security checks at airports, surge operations in areas where law enforcement identifies a growing threat can introduce a greater level of uncertainty in the minds of criminal planners.

Improve Coordination with Foreign Governments
Border patrol is not the first line of defense in border security, and CBP
has worked over the past several years to improve coordination with foreign governments to help with shipping and security practices. Criminals
and terrorists continue, however, to exploit weaker immigration controls
in Central/South American nations to gain entry into the United States. It
is vital the U.S. Government continue to forge security partnerships with
nations in the Americas and provide guidance and support to these
nations to improve their document controls, anti-corruption measures,
and immigration standards.
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Emphasize Linguistic Skills and Training at the Southern
Border
Because of the international nature of border security, CBP must increase
the available pool of agents with advanced secondary language skills. This
is particularly important along the southern border, where it is believed
that foreign operatives are moving to Central and South America, adopting Latin American identities, and learning to speak Spanish before
attempting to sneak across the border. Thus, CBP should engage in
expanded linguistic training for Border Patrol agents, and place an
emphasis on hiring agents with native Spanish-speaking ability that are
better able to detect differences in dialect and identify SIAs posing as
Latin Americans.

Conclusion
Immigration and border security remain hot-button political issues in
American public discourse. Policymakers can no longer afford to avoid
addressing America's growing border security threats. For too long America's border security efforts have placed emphasis on unproven technology and relied solely on tactical infrastructure as the solutions to
America's border security demands. While sensors and fences remain
critical components of the overall border security strategy, they amount to
very little without sufficient numbers of motivated and trained agents to
rapidly respond to detected threats. As a result, today's border security
posture has left federal, state, and local law enforcement overburdened
and the majority of the U.S. border uncontrolled. While today's economic
realities make procuring funds for any security endeavor more difficult,
policymakers must act on their obligation to protect American citizens by
enhancing border security measures. Simply put, in terms of national
security priorities, none ranks higher than protecting the homeland. The
U.S. Government must significantly increase the number of personnel
available for border security by leveraging local law enforcement and
increasing the ranks of the CBP. It must also place an increased emphasis
on rapid response capabilities, intelligence-driven surge operations,
proven technology, interagency coordination, and international cooperation to act as force multipliers.

44

https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol4/iss3/4
DOI: <p>http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.4.3.3</p>

Steinmetz: Mitigating the Exploitation of U.S. Borders by Jihadists and Crim

Mitigating the Exploitation of U.S. Borders by Jihadists and Criminal Organizations

About the Author
Todd Steinmetz has a Master of Science in Terrorism and Counterterrorism Studies from Henley-Putnam University and is Homeland Security
Analyst at Information and Infrastructure Technologies (IIT), a subsidiary of Electronic Warfare Associates (EWA) in Herndon, Virginia. During
his time at IIT, he has provided system security engineering, critical infrastructure protection, homeland security, and intelligence services to government and commercial clients, including the National Guard, States,
the Texas Border Security Operations Center, and the Critical Infrastructure Protection Center. In these roles, he developed the initial opensource collection process for the Texas Border Security Operations Center; published daily open-source analyses of Mexico's drug war and Texas
border security operations; coordinated the collection of intelligence
information from more than eighty law enforcement agencies; developed
and delivered training for National Guard WMD Civil Support Teams and
other homeland response forces; and supported process analysis, risk
management, training, communications, marketing, and business management for EWA/IIT. The author may be reached for comment at:
tsteinmetz@ewa.com.

References
1 Fred Burton and Ben West, "When the Mexican Drug Trade Hits the Border," Stratfor, April 15, 2009, available at: http://tinyurl.com/cxr6y7 (www.stratfor.com/
weekly/20090415_when_mexican_drug_trade_hits_border).
2 Michael T. McCaul, Chairman, Majority Staff House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Investigations, "A Line in the Sand: Confronting the Threat
at the Southwest Border," U.S. House of Representatives, available at:
http://usgovinfo.about.com/library/PDF/Border-Report.pdf.
3 SIA statistics remain the most frequently cited metric for quantifying the terrorist
threat posed by illegal immigration.
4 Christopher Sands, "Al Qaeda in Canada," MacDonald-Laurier Institute, August 26,
2010, available at: http://www.macdonaldlaurier.ca/al-qaeda-in-canada/.
5 U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), "Performance and Accountability
Report: Fiscal Year 2009," U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2010, available
at: http://tinyurl.com/3z8wphe (www.cbp.gov/linkhandler/cgov/newsroom/
publications/admin/perform_rpt_2009.ctt/perform_rpt_2009.pdf).
6 Sands, "Al Qaeda in Canada."
7 McCaul, "A Line in the Sand," 4.

45

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2011

Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 4, No. 3

Journal of Strategic Security

8 Tim Johnson, "Mexico Rethinks Drug Strategy as Death Toll Soars," McClatchy
Newspapers, October 6, 2010, available at: http://tinyurl.com/4yzpl2u
(www.mcclatchydc.com/2010/08/12/99089/mexico-rethinks-drug-strategy.html#ixzz150Ya0odd).
9 "Mexican Drug Wars: Bloodiest Year to Date," Stratfor, December 20, 2010, available at: http://tinyurl.com/3c6g6qw (www.stratfor.com/memberships/178265/
analysis/20101218-mexican-drug-wars-bloodiest-year-date).
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid.
12 Johnson, "Mexico Rethinks Drug Strategy."
13 Ibid.
14 Colleen Long and Will Weissert,"Risks grow for those whose lives straddle border,"
Associated Press, November 10, 2010, available at:
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/40113284/ns/world_news-americas/.
15 Long and Weissert, "Risks grow for those whose lives straddle the border."
16 McCaul, "A Line in the Sand," 4.
17 Ibid., 19.
18 Karla Ronquillo, "Three Separate Assaults on Border Patrol Agents," CBS News 13
(Arizona), March 29, 2010, available at: http://tinyurl.com/3uhljgb
(www.kold.com/story/12188554/three-separate-assaults-on-border-patrolagents?redirected=true).
19 "Secret Underground," The History Channel, December 10, 2010, available at:
http://www.history.com/shows/modern-marvels/episodes/episode-guide.
20 Jacob Goodwin, "Gabby Giffords: Champion of Tough Border Security Laws,"
Government Security News (GSN), January 9, 2011, available at:
http://www.gsnmagazine.com/node/22168.
21 Fred Burton and Ben West, "When the Mexican Drug Trade Hits the Border."
22 McCaul, "A Line in the Sand," 14.
23 Burton and West, "When the Mexican Drug Trade Hits the Border."
24 Ibid.
25 McCaul, "A Line in the Sand," 15.
26 Burton and West, "When the Mexican Drug Trade Hits the Border."
27 McCaul, "A Line in the Sand," 14.
28 Ibid., 14–15.
29 Ibid., 14.
30 Sands, "Al Qaeda in Canada."
31 Ibid., 30.
32 McCaul, "A Line in the Sand," 32.

46

https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol4/iss3/4
DOI: <p>http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.4.3.3</p>

Steinmetz: Mitigating the Exploitation of U.S. Borders by Jihadists and Crim

Mitigating the Exploitation of U.S. Borders by Jihadists and Criminal Organizations

33 CBP, "Performance and Accountability Report, 2009."
34 Todd Owen, CBP Acting Deputy Assistant Commissioner, Field Operations, "Border Security and Facilitation of Legitimate Trade, Travel," Testimony before the
House Oversight and Government Reform Committee, U.S. House of Representatives, July 9, 2009, available at: http://tinyurl.com/3um5ffb (www.cbp.gov/xp/
cgov/newsroom/congressional_test/security_trade_travel.xml).
35 Chad C. Haddal, "Border Security: The Role of the U.S. Border Patrol," Congressional Research Service, August 11, 2010, 5–6, available at:
http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL32562_20100811.pdf.
36 U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), Office of Technology Innovation and
Acquisition, CBP website, available at:
http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/border_security/otia/.
37 Cheryl Sullivan, "US cancels 'virtual fence' along Mexican border. What's Plan B?"
Christian Science Monitor, January 15, 2011, available at:
http://tinyurl.com/4hrwdap (www.csmonitor.com/USA/2011/0115/US-cancelsvirtual-fence-along-Mexican-border.-What-s-Plan-B). See also: CNN, "Homeland
Security chief cancels costly virtual border fence," CNN website, January 14, 2011,
available at: http://tinyurl.com/3ghbou8 (articles.cnn.com/2011-01-14/us/border.virtual.fence_1_virtual-fence-sbinet-border?_s=PM:US).
38 Haddal, "Border Security: the Role of the U.S. Border Patrol."
39 Owen, "Border Security and Facilitation of Legitimate Trade, Travel."
40 Ibid.
41 Spencer Hsu, "Work to cease on 'virtual fence' along U.S.-Mexico border," Washington Post, March 16, 2010, available at: http://tinyurl.com/2ear2qh
(www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/03/16/
AR2010031603573.html).
42 Randolph C. Hite, CPB Director for Information Technology Architecture and System Issues, "Secure Border Initiative: DHS Needs to Follow Through on Plans to
Reassess and Better Manage Key Technology Program," Testimony before the
House Subcommittees on Management, Investigations, and Oversight and Border,
Maritime, and Global Terrorism, and the Committee on Homeland Security, U.S.
House of Representatives, June 17, 2010, available at:
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10840t.pdf.
43 Haddal, "Border Security," 35–36.
44 Ibid.
45 Ibid.
46 William McQuillen and Emily Heller, "US Sues Arizona to Block Enforcement of
State Immigration Law," Bloomberg.com, July 7, 2010, available at:
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=2065100&sid=aod2QZSDpoQk.
47 McCaul, "A Line in the Sand," 2.

47

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2011

Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 4, No. 3

Journal of Strategic Security

48 U.S. House Representative Gabrielle Giffords, "U.S. Rep. Gabrielle Giffords' Statement on the Federal Challenge to Arizona's Immigration Law," July 6, 2010, available at: http://tinyurl.com/3kk2zcq (giffords.house.gov/2010/07/us-repgabrielle-giffords-statement-on-the-federal-challenge-to-arizonas-immigrationlaw.shtml).
49 James F. Tomsheck, Assistant Commissioner, Office of Internal Affairs, CBP,
"Ensuring the Integrity of CBP," Testimony before the Senate Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs Committee, U.S. House of Representatives, March 11,
2010, available at: http://tinyurl.com/3cebrv3 (www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/newsroom/congressional_test/cbp_integrity.xml).
50 Ibid.
51 Jacob Goodwin, "CBP Eyes Fixed Surveillance Towers as Part of Its New Border
Strategy," Government Security News (GSN), February 14, 2011, available at:
http://www.gsnmagazine.com/node/22449.
52 "Industry Focus: Flying High," Homeland Defense Journal 6, no. 3 (2008): 12–14.
53 Ibid.
54 Ibid.
55 Spencer Ackerman, "Northrop's Huge Army Spy Blimp Floats On," Wired.com,
November 4, 2010, available at: http://tinyurl.com/3ldjeo7 (www.wired.com/
dangerroom/2010/11/northrops-huge-army-spy-blimp-floats-on/).
56 Owen, "Border Security."
57 Ibid.
58 Paul Serluco, "Fusion Centers," Homeland Defense Journal 6, no. 3 (2008): 16.
59 Ibid., 16–18.
60 Ibid., 19.

48

https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol4/iss3/4
DOI: <p>http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.4.3.3</p>

